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Admitting the Problem with the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program 
By: Andrew Tobel
1
 
 
Introduction 
Health care reform is quickly changing the health care landscape. Over sixty-five 
provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) have taken effect since it 
became law on March 23, 2010, with another fifteen to take effect in 2014.
2
 The PPACA 
represents the biggest legislative reform to take place since enactment of the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs in 1965. The impact of some provisions has been more dramatic than 
anticipated. Hospitals argue that the “Hospital Readmission Reduction Program” (HRRP), which 
was implemented last year, is on the top of their list.
3
 This provision hits hospitals where it really 
hurts: their wallet.  
Under the HRRP a hospital’s Medicare reimbursements are reduced when a hospital 
experiences excess readmission rates for certain health conditions denominated by the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services (HHS).
4
 Hospitals, professional practitioners, and academics have 
criticized the the HRRP. Some argue that the HRRP unjustly places all the blame for excessive 
costs, presumably due to lack of quality care, on hospitals.
5
 Hospitals assert that other providers 
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2
 Healthcare Reformation Implementation Timeline, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (2010), 
http://kff.org/interactive/implementation-timeline/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
3
 See Jordan Rau, Armed With Bigger Fines, Medicare To Punish 2,225 Hospitals For Excess Readmissions, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2013/august/02/readmission-penalties-
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4
 42 U.S.C. §1395ww(q)(4)(C) (2010); 42 U.S.C. §1395ww(q)(5)(A) (2010).   
5
 See generally Julia Berenson and Anthony Shih, Higher Readmissions at Safety-Net Hospitals and Potential Policy 
Solutions, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Dec. 2012) (noting that processes implemented at the hospital and 
community provider level, such as through ACOs and bundle payments, can reduce readmissions.) 
must also provide quality health care post-discharge to reduce readmission rates and to keep 
costs down.
6 
 
Part I of this Note introduces Medicare and its reimbursement mechanisms, showing how 
such mechanisms affect provider behavior, thereby contributing to high or unconstrained 
spending. Part II of this Note discusses concerns about Medicare spending and Congress’s 
solution to the costs of the Medicare program. Specifically, Part II discusses the HRRP, the 
methodology used to calculate HRRP reimbursement reduction penalty, and New Jersey’s 
readmission rate problem. Part III of this Note looks at the economics of the HRRP, surveys how 
hospitals are responding, and discusses the practices New Jersey hospitals are implementing to 
reduce readmissions. Lastly, this Note concludes by discussing how the HRRP should be 
changed by redefining the Risk Adjustment Factor or converting to a peer review standard, rather 
than a national standard, to determine the reimbursement reduction penalty.  
I. Part I 
Medicare was established in 1965 under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act as a 
public health insurance program.
7
 Medicare consists of four parts. Individuals qualify for Part A 
if they are sixty-five years and over, have worked for forty quarters in Medicare covered 
employment and are U.S. citizens or permanent legal residents, regardless of medical history, 
preexisting conditions, assets, or income.
8
 Under limited circumstances an individual under 
sixty-five may qualify for Medicare Part A.
9
  
                                                 
6
 Telephone Interview with Eileen Clifford, M.D., Medical Director of Care Management, Saint Joseph’s Medical 
Regional Medical Center (Nov. 4, 2013). 
7
 Medicare: A Primer, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION 1 (2010), available at 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7615-03.pdf. 
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 Id. at 2. 
9
 Persons under age 65 who have a permanent disability, end-stage renal disease (ESRD), or Lou Gehrig’s disease 
(ALS) are also eligible for Medicare benefits, with certain illness specific benefit restrictions. A person with a 
A qualified beneficiary under Medicare Part A receives coverage for hospital care, skilled 
nursing facility care, non-custodial nursing home care, hospice, and home health services.
10
 In 
2011 Medicare spent $552 billion on health care of which over $139.7 billion was spent on 
inpatient hospital stays.
11
 Medicare Part A is federally funded through payroll taxes, income 
taxes on social security benefits, and premiums.
12
 However, even with all these sources, 
Medicare funding is precarious for two reasons.  
First, when Medicare was enacted there were four workers paying into the system for 
every retiree.
13
 In 2010, that ratio dropped to 2.9 to 1.
14
 By 2030, it is expected that only 2.3 
people will be paying into public insurance programs for every beneficiary.
15
 Second, Medicare 
spending continues to grow at a rate greater than inflation.
16
 
Medicare already accounts for over 15 percent of federal spending.
17
 The rise in 
Medicare spending will continue to put a strain on the federal budget.
18
 It is estimated that at the 
current spending rate Medicare will become insolvent by 2026.
19
  
                                                                                                                                                             
permanent disability must wait 24 months after receiving Social Security Disability Income (SSDI) until they 
qualify for receiving Medicare Benefits, notwithstanding failure to make payroll tax contributions for forty quarters. 
However, individuals with ESRD or ALS may begin receiving Medicare benefits as soon as they receive SSDI 
payments. Id. 
10
 What does Medicare Part A Cover?, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/part-
a/what-part-a-covers.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). 
11
 Medicare Payment Advisory Comm'n, Report to the Congress: A Date Book: Health Care Spending and the 
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12
 How is Medicare funded?, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.medicare.gov/about-us/how-
medicare-is-funded/medicare-funding.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2013). 
13
 Frequently Asked Questions: Ratio of Covered Workers to Beneficiaries, SSA.GOV 
http://www.ssa.gov/history/ratios.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). 
14
 Id.  
15
 Avik Roy, Saving Medicare from Itself, 8 NAT’L AFF. 35, 35 (2011). 
16
 Robert E. Moffit & Alyene Senger, Medicare’s Rising Costs—and the Urgent Need for Reform, 2779 THE 
BACKGROUNDER 1, 2 (Mar. 22, 2013); Roy, supra note 15, at 35.  
17
 Moffit & Senger, supra note 16, at 2. 
18
 Report to Congress: Reforming the Delivery System: Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 3 (2008) (statement of Mark 
Miller, Executive Director Medicare Payment Advisory Commission) [hereinafter Miller Report]. 
19
 Brett Norman, Medicare Exhausted in 2026, Trustees Say, POLITICO (May 31, 2013 11:10 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/05/medicare-exhausted-2026-trustees-92066.html.  
The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) is an independent 
Congressional federal body that advises Congress on issues affecting Medicare.
20
 In order to 
prevent insolvency, MedPAC has been determining how to reduce costs.
21
 MedPAC’s 2007 
annual report made several suggestions on how to increase efficiency and decreases costs to help 
reduce Medicare spending.
22
  
For example, MedPAC has recommended that reducing hospital in-patient readmissions 
can reduce Medicare spending.
23
 Consequently, the HRRP was enacted as part of the PPACA.
24
 
This provision has a large impact on hospitals.
25
 How hospitals receive funding under the 
Medicare Payment system must be reviewed to understand why the HRRP has such great 
consequences. 
a. Medicare Payment Systems 
Medicare is a major source of hospital revenues.
26
 Under Medicare Part A, a hospital is 
reimbursed for Medicare beneficiaries admitted on an inpatient basis for medically necessary 
treatment.
27
 Hospitals receive reimbursement for services provided to Medicare beneficiaries 
under a Prospective Payment System (PPS).
28
 Payments are only made for the amount that 
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 Medicare Payment Advisory Comm'n, Report to the Congress: Promoting Greater Efficiency in Medicare ii 
(2007), available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun07_EntireReport.pdf [hereinafter MedPAC 2007 
Report].  
21
 See Id. at 103-05. 
22
 Miller Report , supra note 18, at 4-7. 
23
 See MedPAC 2007 Report, supra note 20, at 103-05. 
24
 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111- 148, § 3025, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
25
 Id. 
26
 Symposium, Hospital Cost Containment in Iowa: A Guide for State Public Policymakers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1263, 
1291 (1984). 
27
 42 U.S.C. 1395f (2012); 1869 AM. JUR. 2D Soc. Security and Medicare § 1927 (2014).  
28
 Prospective Payment Systems - General Information, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.,  
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ProspMedicareFeeSvcPmtGen/index.html (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
reflects the reasonable cost of providing such treatment.
29
 The payments are determined by 
diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment schedules.
30
 A DRG accounts for the “principal 
diagnosis, complicating or comorbid conditions, surgical procedures, age/sex and discharge 
status.”31 Thus, in a very generalized way, hospitals are not reimbursed for the actual cost of a 
patient’s care, but rather for what it should have cost to care for the patient based upon the 
assigned DRG.
32
 Consequently, the hospital loses money if the cost of the actual length of the 
patient’s stay, or quantity of services ordered by the physician, exceeds what Medicare 
reimburses for that specific DRG code. Thus, under the PPS system, hospitals focus on 
“maximizing the overall profit from each Medicare patient” by discharging patients as quickly as 
possible.
33
  
Medicare pays doctors, on the other hand, on a fee-for-service (FFS) payment system. 
Under this system doctors receive funds under a “comprehensive listing of fee maximums” 
which “is used to reimburse a physician and/or other providers” based on the services provided.34 
Unlike hospitals, doctors are not paid based on the value of the service provided but rather on the 
volume of service provided.
35
 “The traditional program’s fee-for-service payment system … 
encourages an increase in the volume of services requested, which encourages excessive 
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 Medically necessity is determined by a peer review organization that independently oversees each hospital. 1869 
AM. JUR. 2D Soc. Security and Medicare § 1927 (2012). 
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 42 C.F.R. 412.60 et seq. (2012). 
31
 Glossary of Terms, STANFORD UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL (1998), 
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CARE 48 (2006). 
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 Robert E. Moffit & Alyene Senger, Medicare’s Rising Costs—and the Urgent Need for Reform, 2779 THE 
BACKGROUNDER 1, 2 (Mar. 22, 2013); 
spending.”36 Therefore, the reimbursement mechanisms for hospitals and doctors are misaligned 
– the system financially penalizes hospitals but rewards physicians for the provisions of 
excessive services.
37
  
For this reason, Medicare’s spending continues to increase not only because of the rise in 
health care costs but largely because of the rise in number of services provided.
38
 In fact, a 2007 
study by the Congressional Budget Office determined that fees paid by Medicare Part B 
decreased, as a result of the Sustainable Growth Rate, but that the total cost of services paid by 
the program increased 34.5 percent.
39
 This demonstrates that doctors have been increasing the 
volume of services provided.  
A tension exists between hospitals and doctors because of the difference in pay systems. 
Hospitals know the amount of reimbursement they will receive based on the DRG assigned. 
Therefore hospitals want to discharge Medicare beneficiaries before the cost of treatment is 
greater than the DRG reimbursement. However, doctors are incentivized to keep patients and 
provide more “services” because they are paid under a FFS system.  
Some hospitals have dealt with this issue through controversial economic credentialing, 
whereby physicians’ practice patterns are taken into account when they seek reappointment to 
the medical staff.
40
 Some hospitals attempted to engage in profit-sharing with physicians, which 
the IRS quickly declared illegal for tax-exempt hospitals, as private inurement, and HHS deemed 
to constitute illegal remuneration under the anti-kickback statutes.
41
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 Id.  
37
 Avik Roy, Saving Medicare from Itself, 8 NAT’L AFF. 35, 42 (2011). 
38
 See Id. at 41. 
39
 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, Pub. No. 2597, FACTORS UNDERLYING THE GROWTH IN MEDICARE’S SPENDING 
FOR PHYSICIANS’ SERVICES 2 (2007). 
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 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (2012); 26 C.F.R. 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (2012). 
More current schemes involve gainsharing with physicians, an arrangement where 
hospital gives physicians a percentage of any reduction in the hospital’s costs for patient care 
which can be attributed to the efforts of the physician.
42
 The HHS has been suspicion of these 
programs as well.
43
 While the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has approved some 
gainsharing programs, the analysis of each program is highly fact-specific.
44
 The OIG believes 
that some programs may reduce access to services or new technology.
45
 Hospitals are faced with 
civil monetary penalties for schemes that encourage reduction in care provided to a patient.
46
  
Therefore, hospitals have few legal means to encourage changes in physician practice 
patterns that are not to their financial advantage. Regardless of how hospitals have developed 
physician cooperation, the end game is the same; hospitals seek to discharge patients as soon as 
possible so that the cost of care is below the DRG reimbursement. 
Part of the PPACA’s purpose was to address this realignment, and eliminate the financial 
incentives which perversely increase the cost of care. This was done by replacing past payment 
structures with financial incentives and penalties that reward quality care. For example, global 
payments, whereby all providers in the continuum of care will have to work together to provide 
patients with quality care in the most cost-efficient manner, is one way to transition away from 
FFS payments.
47
 The purpose behind these programs or new payment schedules is to reduce 
                                                 
42
 Gainsharing, AMERICAN HEALTH LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.healthlawyers.org/hlresources/Health%20Law%20Wiki/Gainsharing.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2014). 
43
 The Office of the Inspector General has exercised caution on whether to impose Civil Monetary Penalties for such 
programs. Id.  
44
 Id.  
45
 Id. 
46
 Id. 
47
 Michael Chernew & Dana Goldman,  Proposal 1: Transitioning to Bundled Payments in Medicare , in 15 WAYS 
TO RETHINK THE FEDERAL BUDGET 12 (Michael Greenstone et al. eds., 2013)  
costs. Through these bundle payment programs, provider systems are presented with new 
opportunities to develop systematic processes that help to avoid and reduce readmissions.
48
 
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has been serially focusing on 
specific practice patterns that are perceived to be particular culprits of unnecessarily high costs.  
CMS is concerned with readmissions because the DRG payment system encourages hospitals to 
discharge patients prematurely, as discuss above.
49
 Under the old DRG payment system, 
hospitals are paid on a per admission basis.
50
 Therefore, hospitals had no incentive to reduce 
readmissions.
51
 In fact, a hospital that is not at full capacity has an incentive not to reduce 
readmissions because a new patient coming through the door means an increased stream of 
revenue.
52
 The HRRP seeks to encourage hospitals to reduce readmissions or face a penalty.
53
 
MedPAC believes that preventing one out of every ten readmissions would save over one billion 
dollars annually.
54
 
II. PART II 
In 2007, MedPAC issued a report to Congress outlining how avoidable readmissions 
were adversely affecting the Medicare Program.
55
 The report noted that nearly 20 percent of 
                                                 
48
 Berenson, supra note 5, at 9-10. 
49
 Becky S. Cornett, Managing Hospital Readmissions: An Overview of the Issues, 13 J. OF HEALTH CARE COMP. 5, 
12 (2011)002E 
50
 Id. at 13. 
51
 See MedPAC 2007 Report, supra note 20, at 105; Jordan Rau, Medicare To Penalize 2,217 Hospitals For Excess 
Readmissions, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 13, 2012), 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2012/august/13/medicare-hospitals-readmissions-penalties.aspx. 
52
 Robert Berenson et al., Medicare’s Readmissions-Reduction Program — A Positive Alternative, 366 N. ENGL. J. 
MED. 1364, 1364 (2012). 
53
 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111- 148, § 3025, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
54
 Medicare Payment Advisory Comm'n, Report to the Congress: Refining the Hospital Readmissions Reduction 
Program 96 (2013), available at http://www.medpac.gov/chapters/Jun13_Ch04.pdf [hereinafter MedPAC 2013 
Report]. 
55
 MedPAC 2007 Report, supra note 20, at 103. 
Medicare patients are readmitted within a month of their initial discharge.
56
 These readmissions 
account for over $17 billion in Medicare spending annually.
57
 In an effort to curtail this 
ostensibly preventable spending, MedPAC recommended that Congress adopt a two-part policy 
to reduce Medicare spending attributable to hospital readmissions.
58
 
First, MedPAC proposed that Congress require hospitals to report “hospital-specific 
readmission rates for a subset of conditions.”59 There are many instances in which quantifying a 
behavior can contribute to changing that behavior, especially where the opportunity exists for 
comparative analysis.
60
 Congress codified this recommendation,
61
 and these reports are now 
available for every hospital covered by the HRRP at CMS’s Hospital Compare website.62 
MedPAC expects providers to use this information “to adjust their practice styles and coordinate 
care to reduce service use.”63 
Second, MedPAC proposed that Congress adjust the underlying payment method to 
financially encourage hospitals to reduce readmission rates.
64
 The suggestion was that a 
proposed penalty scheme would reduce payments for hospitals that had “high readmissions 
rate[s] for select conditions.”65  
In 2008 the Executive Director of MedPAC addressed the Senate Committee on Finance 
noting that Medicare’s FFS payment system “reward(s) providers who increase the volume of 
                                                 
56
 Jordan Rau, Medicare To Penalize 2,217 Hospitals For Excess Readmissions, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 13, 
2012), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2012/august/13/medicare-hospitals-readmissions-penalties.aspx. 
57
 Robert Berenson et al., Medicare’s Readmissions-Reduction Program — A Positive Alternative, 366 N. ENGL. J. 
MED. 1364, 1364 (2012). 
58
 MedPAC 2007 Report, supra note 20, at 103. 
59
 MedPAC 2007 Report, supra note 20, at 103. 
60
 E.g., MAYES, supra note 33, at 48-53 (discussing the increased competition between hospitals as a result of the 
implementation of PPS system which lead to reduced costs).  
61
 42 U.S.C. §1395ww(q)(6) (2012).  
62
 Id.; See Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program: Overview, QUALITYNET 
http://qualitynet.org/dcs/ContentServer?c=Page&pagename=QnetPublic%2FPage%2FQnetTier2&cid=1228772412
458 (last visited Sept. 19, 2013). 
63
 Miller Report , supra note 18, at 13. 
64
 MedPAC 2007 Report, supra note 20, at 103-04. 
65
 Miller Report , supra note 18, at 14. 
services they provide regardless of the benefit of the service.”66 These statements in conjunction 
with MedPAC’s 2007 report sufficiently highlighted the negative effects that hospital 
readmissions have on the quality and cost of health care. Congress reacted by adding the 
“Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program” to the PPACA.67 
a. Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program 
There is a heavy cost for excessive readmissions rates under the HRRP.
68
 The HRRP 
adjusts the Medicare payments (a.k.a. Total Base Operating DRG Payment) a hospital receives 
through the inpatient prospective payment system when readmission rates are higher than 
expected.
69
 The penalties are based on the readmissions rates for Medicare patients who are 
readmitted into a hospital with one of three diagnoses.
70
 Currently, those three conditions are 
pneumonia (PN), acute myocardial infarction (AMI), and heart failure (HF).
71
 The statute defines 
a “readmission” as a patient that returns to any hospital within thirty days of a discharge who is 
readmitted as an inpatient.
72
 However, readmissions “that are unrelated to the prior discharge 
(such as a planned readmission or transfer to another applicable hospital),” are not considered 
readmission for the purpose of calculating the readmission rate.
73
 
                                                 
66
 Id. at 4. 
67
 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111- 148, § 3025, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
68
 See Rau, supra note 3.  
69
 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q) (2012). 
70
 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(5)(A)(i) (2012). 
71
 Readmissions Reduction Program, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., 
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/Readmissions-Reduction-
Program.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).  To be selected as an applicable condition must be a condition or procedure 
“for which (1) readmissions are ‘high volume or high expenditure’; and (2) ‘measures of such readmissions’ have 
been endorsed by the entity with a contract under section 1890(a) of the Act (currently [the National Quality 
Forum]) and (3) such endorsed measures have exclusions for readmissions that are unrelated to the prior discharge 
(such as a planned readmission or transfer to another applicable hospital).” 76 Fed. Reg. 51476, 51665 (Aug. 18, 
2011).  
72
 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(5)(E) (2012). 
73
 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(5)(A)(ii)(II) (2012). 
The HHS selected the three current applicable conditions for two reasons. First, 
according to CMS, the three diagnoses are the most common ailments among Medicare 
beneficiaries.
74
 Reducing readmissions for these patients will create the greatest decrease in costs 
because these conditions are the most common. Second, these three conditions were extensively 
reported on from 2009 to 2012 to the Medicare Hospital Compare website.
75
 CMS believes that 
the extensive reporting allowed hospitals adequate time to implement systems to reduce 
readmission rates.
76
 
b. Methodology 
It is important to understand the methodology for how CMS calculates the Total Base 
Operating DRG Payment, Readmission Adjustment Factor and Excess Readmission Ratio.
 77
  
This section first analyzes how the HRRP adjustment factor affects the Base Operating DRG 
Payment a hospital receives and the results from the first two years of experience with the HRRP 
program. Subsequent sections will further analyze how the Readmission Adjustment Factor, its 
component parts, and the Excess Readmission Ratio are calculated. Through an understanding of 
this methodology, it becomes apparent how the government’s policy goals are accomplished. 
Specifically, how the adopted risk adjustment methodology has a large impact on the overall 
Readmission Payment Adjustment. 
i. Calculating Total Base Operating DRG Payment 
                                                 
74
 Cornett, supra note 49, at 5.  
75
 MedPAC 2013 Report, supra note 54, at 97. Specifically the CMS “[e]stablished an applicable period of three 
years of discharge data and the use of a minimum of 25 cases to calculate a hospital’s excess readmission ratio of 
each applicable condition.” Readmissions Reduction Program, supra note 71. 
76
 See 76 Fed. Reg. 51476, 51664 (Aug. 18, 2011).  
77
 “DRG payments” are the IPPS payments a hospital would receive minus disproportionate share hospital 
payments, Indirect Medical Education, and outlier payments. This note ignores other DRG Payment calculation 
factors for simplicity and only assesses DRG Payments made for discharges. See Nikhil Sahni et al., Will The 
Readmission Rate Penalties Drive Hospital Behavior Changes?, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Feb. 14, 2013), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/02/14/will-the-readmission-rate-penalties-drive-hospital-behavior-changes/. 
Before the HRRP was enacted, hospitals received payments for all discharges based on 
reported DRGs.
78
 Now the HRRP affects the Total Base Operating DRG Payment a hospital 
receives through a penalty, the Readmissions Payment Adjustment.
79
 CMS applies a 
Readmission Payment Adjustment to hospitals that exhibit excessive readmissions rates for 
applicable conditions.
80
 The fine takes the shape of a percent reduction in reimbursement – it 
changes each year.
81
 
The Total Base Operating DRG Payment a hospital receives under the HRRP is equal to 
the product of the Base Operating DRG Payment Amount and the Readmission Adjustment 
Factor.
82
 Even though CMS limits its analysis of actual readmission rates to the three applicable 
conditions, it assesses the penalty to all DRG Payments.
83
 The reductions differ from hospital to 
hospital because each hospital’s Readmission Adjustment Factor is different.84 
ii. Calculating the Readmission Adjustment Factor 
The Readmission “[A]djustment [F]actor . . . is equal to the greater of . . . the [R]atio . . . 
or the [F]loor [A]djustment [F]actor” for the given year.85 The Ratio is equal to one minus the 
Aggregate Payments for Excess Readmissions and the Aggregate Payments for all Discharges.
86
 
                                                 
78
 See Jane Hyatt Thorpe & Teresa Cascio, Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, HEALTH REFORM GPS (Nov. 
1, 2011), http://www.healthreformgps.org/resources/hospital-readmissions-reduction-program/.  
79
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(1)(A)-(B) (2012).  
80
 Rau, supra note 3.  
81
 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(3)(C)(i)-(iii) (2012). 
82
 Mathematically represented as follows: Payment = Base Operating DRG Payment Amount * Readmissions 
Payment Adjustment Factor). 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(1). 
83
 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(1) (2012); See Readmissions Reduction Program, supra note 71. 
84
 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(3)(A) (2012). 
85
 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)((3)(A)(i)-(ii) (2012).  
86
 Aggregate Payments for Excess Readmissions is defined as “for a hospital . . . for applicable conditions . . . of the 
product of the base operating DRG payment . . . and the number of admissions … and the excess readmissions ratio 
minus one,” for each applicable condition. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(4)(A) (i)-(iii) (2012). Mathematically 
represented as follows: Aggregate payments for excess readmissions = [sum of base operating DRG payments for 
AMI x (excess readmission ratio for AMI-1)] + [sum of base operating DRG payments for HF x (excess readmission 
ratio for HF-1)] + [sum of base operating DRG payments for PN x (excess readmission ratio for PN-1)]. 
Readmission Reductions Program, supra note 71. Aggregate Payment for all Discharges means “the sum of the base 
As defined, the Ratio is capped by the statute. Therefore, for fiscal year 2012, the maximum 
penalty a hospital could be assessed was one percent of its Medicare DRG Payment, i.e. an 
adjustment factor of .99.
87
 This means a hospital only received 99 percent of its Medicare DRG 
payments. If the Ratio, for fiscal year 2012, was greater than the .99 floor adjustment factor, then 
a penalty of less than 1 percent would be applied. For fiscal year 2013 and 2014 this penalty will 
increase to 2 and 3 percent, respectively.
88
 
Over 2,225 hospitals received a reimbursement reduction for the 2012 fiscal year.
89
 This 
totaled $280 million in penalties that Medicare collected from hospitals with excessive 
readmission rates.
90
 It is expected that Medicare will collect $227 million for the 2013 fiscal 
year, when the penalty cap increases to two percent.
91
  
iii. Calculating Excess Readmission Ratio 
The Excessive Readmission Ratio, a key component to determine the Aggregate Payment 
for Excess Readmission, is defined as “the ratio (but not less than 1.0) of . . . the risk adjusted 
readmissions based on actual readmissions . . . to the risk adjusted expected readmissions.”92  
The most important language in this statute is that the PPACA does allow for risk 
adjustments for factors affecting a hospital’s readmission and expected readmission rate.93 CMS 
                                                                                                                                                             
operating DRG payment amounts for all discharges for all conditions from such hospital for such applicable period.” 
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(4)(B). 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(3)(B)(i)-(ii). Therefore the Ratio is mathematically 
represented as follow:         
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asserts that the risk adjustment performed “‘levels the playing field’ for comparing hospital 
performance.”94 The risk adjustment factors for each hospital’s expected readmission rate 
currently include patient demographic characteristics, comorbidities, and patient frailty.
95
 This 
final rate is called the Risk Adjusted Expected Readmission Rate.
96
 In simplistic terms, this 
means that the Risk Adjusted Expected Readmission Rate is the average rate of hospitals with 
the same patient mix, where patient mix is determined by age, comorbidity, and patient frailty.  
iv. Policy decisions for Risk Adjustment 
How readmissions and expected readmissions are risk adjusted has a large impact on the 
Total Base Operating DRG Payment a hospital receives. The methodology for determining risk 
adjustment for these figures presents a key opportunity to implement government policy.
97
 The 
National Quality Forum (NQF) is “a nonprofit, nonpartisan, public service organization” that 
“reviews, endorses, and recommends use of standardized healthcare performance measures.”98 
CMS adopted and finalized the NQF’s proposed risk-adjustment methodology in its FY 2012 
IPPS Final Rule.
99
 
                                                                                                                                                             
93
 Readmissions Reduction Program, supra note 71. “[T]he risk adjusted expected readmissions based on actual 
readmissions” are determined in a manner “consistent with a readmission measure methodology that” is endorsed by 
an entity under contract. The National Quality Forum (NQF) is the current entity under contract, codified at 42 
U.S.C. 1395aaa(a), and has broad discretion to endorse methodologies. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(4)(C)(i)(I)-(II) 
(2012); 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(5)(A)(ii)(I) (2012). 
94
 76 Fed. Reg. 51476, 51670 (Aug. 18, 2011).  
95
 Readmission Reductions Program, supra note 71. 
96
 Sahni, supra note 77. To calculate the adjustment factor for Fiscal Year 2014, CMS is excluding planned 
readmissions, which are known at the time of discharge, from the calculation of the risk-adjusted readmission rate. 
Jordan Rau, Sources and Methodology: A Guide To Medicare’s Readmissions Data And KHN’s Analysis, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2013/August/02/readmission-penalties-
methodology.aspx.  
97
 Currently, the NQF is under contract, pursuant to 42 USC 1395aaa(a), and proposes risk-standardized readmission 
measures for the three applicable conditions under the HRRP. 76 Fed. Reg. 51476, 51668 (Aug. 18, 2011).  
98
 Who We Are, QUALITY FORUM, http://www.qualityforum.org/who_we_are.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2014). 
99
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However, many commenters to the final rule argue that the risk adjustment that was 
proposed, and subsequently adopted, is insufficient.
100
 Commenters suggest that the risk 
adjustment needs to include “patient race, language, life circumstances, environmental factors, 
and socioeconomic status” to truly level the playing field.101 Critics are concerned that the HRRP 
will “disproportionately affect hospitals serving a large number of minorities,” and thus “by 
penalizing these hospitals, the program” will disproportionately harm minority patients.102 
CMS does not believe that the adopted risk adjustments harm minorities.
103
 CMS asserts 
that the risk adjustments “are risk-standardized readmission measure[s] that adjust . . . age, sex, 
comorbid disease and indicators of patient frailty” that have a “strong relationship[] with the 
outcome.”104 CMS believes that other factors, such as race, socioeconomic status, and English 
language proficiency are not appropriate to capture in the Risk Adjustment Factor.
105
 Critics of 
the current risk adjustment assert that socioeconomic status affects readmission rates because 
low-income patients lack access to primary care physicians, post-discharge medication and 
transportation for follow-up appointments.
106
 CMS counters that the “association between such 
patient factors and health outcomes” is due to "differences in the quality of health care received” 
and that “better quality of care is achievable regardless” of such factors.107  
Relatedly, other critics assert that the current risk adjustment structure is insufficient in 
regard to safety net hospitals.
108
 Commenters believe such categories of hospitals are at an 
increased risk of receiving penalties under the HRRP because “their patients are sicker, lack 
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access to appropriate post-discharge care, may suffer numerous chronic conditions, and may 
have substance abuse or behavioral problems.”109 This proposition is supported by Kaiser Health 
News’ analysis of the penalties assessed in the first year of the HRRP.110 Kaiser Health News 
separated hospitals into four groups based on a CMS index which determines whether a hospital 
“deserves extra payments for treating large numbers of low-income patients.”111 Over 12 percent 
of hospitals in the group with the most low-income patients received the maximum penalty for 
excess readmissions compared to only 7 percent of hospitals in the group that treat the fewest 
poor patients.
112
 Kaiser Health News’ found that safety net hospitals were more likely to receive 
a penalty of any size than non-safety net hospitals.
113
 During the HRRP’s second year of 
penalties Kaiser Health News’ analysis revealed that over 77 percent of safety net hospitals were 
penalized compared to only 36 percent of hospitals treating the fewest poor patients.
114
 Critics of 
the current risk adjustment assert that socioeconomic status effect readmission rates because low-
income patients lack access to primary care physicians, post-discharge medication and 
transportation for follow-up appointments.
115
  
However, CMS does not accept that the HRRP’s current risk adjustment methodology 
has a disparate impact on safety net hospitals.
116
 CMS suggests that many safety net hospitals 
perform as well on readmission measures as non-safety net hospitals that have fewer at-risk 
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patients.
117
 For example, Denver Health Medical Center (Denver Health), a safety net hospital, 
has historically had low readmission rates.
118
  
Denver Health has been able to obtain such low readmission rates because of its highly 
integrated system; which includes eight community primary care clinics.
119
 Further, Denver 
Health operates at extremely tight margins and is usually at full capacity, creating strong 
financial incentives to keep readmissions low.
120
 Lastly, Denver Health was an early adopter of 
electronic medical records which allows it to easily coordinate care post-discharge.
121
 Essentially 
Denver Health had already positioned itself to meet HRRP requirements “through its own 
network of family health centers and clinics in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods;” 
something that many safety net hospitals cannot easily replicate.
122
  
CMS asserts that the current risk adjustment measure accounts for the likelihood that 
certain patient groups have a greater disease burden because of their race and/or socioeconomic 
status. Therefore, CMS affirmatively refuses to risk adjust for race and socioeconomic status. 
CMS believes doing so would essentially “hold hospitals to different standards for the outcomes 
of their patients of low socioeconomic status.”123 CMS also believes that allowing risk 
adjustment for race and socioeconomic status could “mask potential disparities or minimize 
incentives to improve the outcomes of disadvantaged populations.”124 Despite the suggested 
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insufficient nature of the risk adjustment factors, CMS adopted the proposed NQF risk adjusted 
methodology which only takes age, comorbidity, and patient frailty into account.
125
 
c. New Jersey’s Readmission Rates Problem 
New Jersey hospitals are experiencing some of the largest fines HRRP penalties. New 
Jersey has a wide variation of readmission rates – 15.8 percent to 25 percent of patients are 
readmitted within thirty days.
126
 In fact, only two hospitals avoided fines in 2013 and only five 
are expected to have improved enough to incur no fine in 2014.
127
 That means that 92 percent of 
hospitals in New Jersey are being assessed fines.  
In fact, the average New Jersey hospital was hit with a .66 percent adjustment factor.
 128
 
This is tied for the third worst average penalty by state.
129
 The story gets worse from there. A 
statistically higher percentage of New Jersey hospitals were hit with the maximum penalty in 
fiscal year 2013 when compared to other states.
130
  
CMS estimated that only 8.8 percent of hospitals nationally would receive the maximum 
penalty.
131
 However, in New Jersey, twenty-two out of sixty-four, or 34.375 percent of hospitals, 
experienced the maximum penalty in 2013.
132
 Whereas the next worst state, Kentucky, only 
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26.15 percent of hospitals received the maximum penalty.
133
 While only one hospital is expected 
to incur the 2 percent maximum fine in New Jersey in 2014, over thirteen hospitals will see their 
Medicare payment adjusted by greater than 1 percent.
134
 Interestingly, these higher fines 
happened even after New Jersey had already reduced its readmission rates by 7.5 percent 
statewide from 2010 to 2012.
135
  
New Jersey’s difficulty in controlling readmission rates is partly attributable to the nature 
of the populations its hospitals serve. New Jersey’s many safety net hospitals provide a 
significant level of care to low-income, uninsured, and vulnerable populations.
136
 In 2012, New 
Jersey’s unemployment rate was 9.5 percent, which is the nation’s forty-seventh worst 
unemployment rate.
137
 Statistically, hospitals that serve a large number of low-income patients 
are more likely to face penalties under the HRRP.
138
 Because New Jersey’s unemployment 
numbers are so high, safety net hospitals are having to provide care to a greater number of low-
income, uninsured, or underinsured patients.  
Nationally, a safety net hospital is 30 percent more likely to have readmission rates above 
the national average and thus receive a penalty.
139
 In fact, 77 percent of safety net hospitals 
received penalties under the HRRP compared to only 36 percent of hospitals that serve the 
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fewest poor patients.
140
 Safety net hospitals are in precarious financial positions before they 
received penalties.
141
 As a result of the disproportionate application of the HRRP penalty, safety-
net hospitals will receive fewer funds to attempt to reduce readmissions, thus compounding the 
problem.  
Low-income patients are more likely to be readmitted for a variety of reasons. First, low-
income patients have “higher rates of chronic health problems, disability, mental illness, and 
substance abuse, compared with the general population.”142 None of these factors are captured in 
CMS’s “risk-adjusted” rate. 143 Current only patient demographic characteristics, comorbidities, 
and patient frailty are considered.
144
 While CMS asserts that the current risk adjustment “levels 
the playing field” it does not do enough. CMS admits that the risk adjustment does not adjust for 
race, English proficiency or SES.
145
 
Second, many low-income patients face adverse social factors such as homelessness, 
unsafe housing, and unstable employment.
146
 This can result in people being over-reliant on their 
local emergency rooms for not only their health care, but for relief of other social problems. 
These factors create barriers to effective health care. Third, many low-income patients often 
don’t have the money to pay for follow-up care post-discharge.147 MedPAC has noted that 
mental illness or substance abuse problems may cause low-income patients to leave the hospital 
against medical advice (AMA), causing a hospital’s performance to appear worse than the 
                                                 
140
 Rau, supra note 3. 
141
 See America’s Safety Net Hospitals and Health Systems, 2010: Results of the 2010 NAPH Hospital 
Characteristics Survey, NAT’L ASSOC. OF PUB. HOSPITALS & HEALTH SYS. 10-15 (May 2012), available at 
www.naph.org/Main-Menu-Category/Publications/Safety-Net-Financing/2010-NAPH-Characteristics-Report.aspx.  
142
 Berenson, supra note 5, at 2. 
143
 See Karen E. Joynt &Ashish K. Jha, A Path Forward on Medicare Readmissions, 368 THE NEW ENGLAND J. OF  
MED. 1175, 1176 (Mar. 28, 2013). 
144
 Readmissions Reduction Program, supra note 71. 
145
 76 Fed. Reg. 51476, 51670 (Aug. 18, 2011). 
146
 Berenson, supra note 5, at 2. 
147
 Rau, supra note 3. 
national average.
148
 While patients that are discharged AMA are not included in readmission 
rates there are many other social factors that subject low-income patients to readmission.
149
 For 
these reasons, low-income patients are at a high-risk for being readmitted.  
Most safety net hospitals have not been able to coordinate post-discharge care with low-
income patients because they have limited resources, small margins and many of their patients 
are “high-risk.” While some safety net hospitals do have access to the resources necessary, it 
often becomes difficult to identify the patients that are in most need of support.
150
 Further, some 
hospitals may be choosing not to implement processes because the cost of such programs would 
be greater than the penalties assessed against them.
151
  
Exacerbating this problem is that hospitals’ readmission rates are compared to a national 
readmission rate standard.
152
 Therefore, as safety net hospitals strive to reduce readmission rates, 
so are other hospitals, driving down the national average readmission rate. Safety net hospitals 
may be chasing an unobtainable goal. The fact that hospitals’ expected readmission ratio and 
actual readmission rates are published on yearly, not a quarterly, basis further complicates the 
decision making process.
153
 Hospitals only have access to their own facility’s patient claims data 
for the prior twelve months and cannot estimate how much the national average will drop.
154
 The 
substantial start-up cost of implementing readmission reduction processes and the unknown 
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predictability of the national readmission rate may prohibit safety net hospitals from responding 
to the HRRP.  
Further, safety net hospitals have struggled in the past to effectively manage post-
discharge care, and few proven methods exist for these hospitals.
155
 However, the CMS asserts 
that safety-net hospitals with limited finances can reduce readmissions, citing Denver Health 
Medical Center as an example.
156
 Therefore, CMS does not and will not consider socioeconomic 
status of patients when determining an expected readmission rate for safety net hospitals.
157
  
New Jersey hospitals’ patient demographics vary across the state but empirical evidence 
shows that hospitals with some of the highest percent of low-income inpatients are receiving the 
maximum fines.
158
 For example, Jersey City Medical Center is listed as one of the worst in the 
nation for readmissions and is receiving the maximum 2 percent fine this year.
159
 This is 
occurring regardless of the fact that Jersey City Medical Center was able to reduce its HF 
readmission rate by over 30 percent from 2008 to 2010.
160
 A simple observation shows that New 
Jersey is way behind the curve in reducing readmission, and, therefore is further away from 
being free of fines. 
III. Analysis 
CMS believes that readmissions can be prevented by “ensuring patients are clinically 
ready at discharge, by reducing the risk of infection, reconciling medications, improving 
                                                 
155
 See Medicare Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Nov. 12, 2012) 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=102.  
156
 Rau, supra note 3. 
157
 Id. 
158
 Medicare Readmission Penalties by Hospital (Year 2), supra note 132. 
159
 Rau, supra note 3. 
160
 Sabrina Rodak, Jersey City Medical Center Cuts Heart Failure Readmissions 30 percent, BECKER’S HOSPITAL 
REVIEW (July 19, 2013), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/quality/jersey-city-medical-center-cuts-heart-
failure-readmissions-30.html.  
communication with community providers participating in transitions of care, educating patients 
adequately upon discharge, and assuring patients under follow-up care upon discharge.”161 Faced 
with increased penalties under the HRRP, hospitals are reshaping old programs and 
implementing new processes during admission, discharge and post-discharge to reduce 
readmissions.
162
 While many hospitals are implementing some or all of CMS’s suggested 
methods, attempts to reduce readmission rates have differed from hospital to hospital.
163
 This 
section will first look at the economic analysis that hospitals perform to determine whether any 
processes should be implement, then look at what processes have been implemented, and 
specifically what hospitals in New Jersey are doing.  
a. Should hospitals respond?: A brief economic analysis 
Some hospitals lost more than $2 million last year and are facing even bigger fines this 
year under the HRRP.
164
 When the HRRP was first implemented hospitals were faced with the 
dilemma of whether reducing readmissions, thereby diminishing a revenue stream, would be a 
greater loss than the penalty they faced under the HRRP.
165
 One economist poses the question as 
such: “assuming that hospitals are self-interested operating-margin maximizers and are 
strategically forward-looking, does the HRRP policy provide economic incentives for a hospital 
to reduce its readmissions?”166 Hospitals have been doing extensive economic analysis to answer 
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this question and determine whether it is cost efficient to react to the HRRP or maintain the 
status quo.
167
  
A substantial factor in determining whether a hospital will react to the HRRP is 
determined by a hospital’s margins.168 Many hospitals were faced by slim margins for Medicare 
inpatient care before the looming threat of HRRP penalties.
169
 In fact, the average hospital 
currently only has a 2 percent margin for Medicare inpatient care.
170
 However, some hospitals 
will not be as affected by the HRRP and may choose not to respond because they “(i) are located 
in sparsely served areas, (ii) have a low fraction of revenue coming from Medicare, (iii) have 
currently high readmission rates, or (iv) have a high contribution margin per patient.”171 
Hospitals’ reactions to the HRRP will occur along a spectrum, from the “wait and see” to the 
aggressive implementation and renovation of processes.
172
 From a purely economic perspective, 
hospitals must look at “the savings in penalty, the loss in contribution, and the cost of reducing 
readmissions.”173 
The behavioral change of a hospital is related to its fixed costs. A hospital may not 
change its processes even if a substantial portion of its margins are reduced by readmission 
penalties if the fixed costs for implementing processes to reduce readmission are high.
174
 
Hospitals will begin to respond to the HRRP once the penalty is greater than those fixed costs.
175
 
The fixed cost hurdle may be lowered by developing methods which not only respond to 
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readmission rates but that also comply with other PPACA provisions.
176
 For example, the 
Accountable Care Collaborative has been able to jointly reduce readmissions and emergency 
room visit rates by creating processes that integrate services.
177
  
When first suggesting readmission reduction legislation, MedPAC believed that a 
financial penalty-only approach would cause “structural changes in the health care delivery 
system.”178 MedPAC was right. After first year reimbursement reductions were assessed, many 
hospitals realized they are facing substantial penalties until they change their practice patterns. 
“Hospitals have moved past 'is this for real' or 'should we do something'" and have begun to 
implement systems to reduce readmissions.
 179
 Further, hospitals are not only concerned with the 
economic implications of the HRRP but also the overall quality of care. So, without regard to the 
economic analysis, many hospitals have begun to respond to the HRRP. 
Empirical evidence shows that hospitals are reacting in a variety of ways. Hospital 
administrators realize that “[i]t's going to take creativity and innovation and most importantly 
reaching outside the hospital walls” to reduce the impact of the HRRP.180 Hospitals have 
recognized that the penalties can have substantial impact on Medicare payments and thus have 
begun to implement systems to reduce readmission rates.
181
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b. Processes Being Implemented 
Hospitals are introducing a variety of processes to reduce readmission rates. Some of 
these processes start when a patient is first admitted.
182
 Under this process, hospitals are 
identifying patients that are at a high-risk for readmission.
183
 A patient is identified as being 
high-risk for readmission based on their age, chronic condition status, race, socioeconomic status 
and English proficiency.
184
 If a patient is at a high-risk for readmission the hospital may respond 
by treating the patient differently to reduce that risk. In fact, Project BOOST (Better Outcomes 
by Optimizing Safe Transitions), created by the Society of Hospital Medicine, has created a 
patient-specific risk-factor analysis that is to be completed upon admission to identify patients 
that are “at increased risk of adverse events post-hospitalization.”185 By identifying high-risk 
patients early on, hospitals believe they will reduce their readmission rates. 
Also, hospitals are attempting to reduce complications during inpatient stays.
186
 This 
includes performing medication reconciliation. Patients often don’t realize that a prescription 
they received in the hospital is duplicative of a medication they already are taking.
187
 Unlike the 
past, medication management is not seamless because the admitting physician, discharging 
physician and “receiving” physician are not the same individual.188 Further complicating the 
process, an individual with comorbidity may be managed not only by a primary care physician 
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but also additional specialists.
189
 Hospitals have identified this silos-within-silos phenomenon as 
creating difficulties in the accurate and complete compiling of patients’ medications list.190 
Hospitals are attempting to reduce these difficulties by reaching outside their walls for help. 
 Hospitals also have been attempting to provide better transition planning by increasing 
and improving communication with post care providers. Hospitals that have a highly integrated 
medical system, like Denver Health Medical Center, are easily able to perform medication 
reconciliation and provide other services subsequent to discharge. Hospitals have also revamped 
their discharge procedures to make sure that patients are better educated about their illness and 
medications.
191
  
Hospital readmission reduction tactics do not end once a patient has been discharged.
192
 
Many hospitals have started to provide support service and transition care after post-discharge.
193
 
This includes scheduling follow-up visits, proving transportation and assigning case managers 
for those with comorbidities or complex cases.
194
 Hospitals believe that increased coordination 
with transition care providers will ensure that patients are receiving the level of care necessary to 
prevent readmission.
195
  
Some hospitals are taking the extra steps to ensure that a patient gets follow-up care 
within a week after leaving the hospitals.
196
 This even includes calling the patient within hours of 
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discharge to ensure they have the support and/or resources necessary to get care.
197
 Hospitals are 
getting creative with the programs they are implementing. For example, Del E. Webb Medical 
Center, in Sun City, Arizona, has started to give bathroom scales and notepads to patients with 
congestive heart failure in order to record small amounts of weight gain, an indicator that a 
patient is retaining water because their heart isn’t pumping adequately.198 Other hospitals are 
implementing more expensive telemedicine home monitoring programs to reduce readmission, 
whereby health data is sent to nurses in real-time in order to prevent unplanned readmissions.
199
 
So from the simple to the complex, the cheap to the expensive, hospitals across the country are 
showing that they are willing to do anything to see smaller penalties under the HRRP.  
c. New Jersey Hospital’s Response 
New Jersey hospitals have been implementing programs to reduce readmission rates in 
order to lower the penalty imposed by the HRRP. Specifically, a “readmissions collaborative” 
was assembled by the New Jersey Hospital Association (NJHA).
200
 The collaborative brings 
together hospitals, nursing homes, home health care, and hospice providers with the realization 
that it takes “an entire community to reduce readmissions.”201 The NJHA realizes that reducing 
readmission rates is really only piece of the puzzle to reducing Medicare costs.
202
 NJHA fully 
expects payment reductions or sanctions to be implemented for nursing homes and other 
providers.
203
 Thus, this collaboration was formed with that possibility in mind. 
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Providers have focused on the relationship between hospitals and nursing homes as a 
potential key to improving hospital readmission rates.
204
 Essentially, hospitals want to be 
reassured that discharged patients sent to skilled nursing facilities are receiving the care they 
need. This means ensuring that skilled nursing facilities have the staff and skill set to prevent 
readmissions.
205
 Hospitals have also begun to communicate with outside providers in advance of 
discharge to ensure that follow-up care is arranged specific to the particular patient’s needs.206 In 
some instances, hospitals are contacting local pharmacists that manage patients’ medication.207  
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation has awarded nine grants in New Jersey to study 
effective ways to reduce readmissions.
208
 Two successful programs have emerged. In one of the 
programs the hospital sends a “coach” to visit newly discharged patients.209 The coach ensures 
that the patient is adhering to all discharge instructions and closely monitors the patient.
210
  
The other successful program implemented intensive case management for low-income 
patients suffering from multiple chronic conditions.
211
 This program directly targets patients who 
are at a high-risk of readmission.
212
 Under the case management model, the most crucial step is 
getting to the root cause of why a patient does not have a primary care physician.
213
 Often the 
answer was cost.
214
 Jersey City Medical Center has taken a different approach. Jersey City 
Medical Center has focused on “enhanced assessment” of the cause behind the readmission.  
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Regardless of the method used, the ultimate goal is to ensure that quality care is being provided 
at a lower cost. Several hospitals are attempting to implement programs to ensure that their 
facility is not subject to higher rates. 
IV. Redefining the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program 
There are many critics of the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program as it currently 
stands. Critics cite to the unintended consequences such as the heavy burden placed on safety net 
hospitals and how it may affect care for vulnerable populations.
215
 One study found that safety 
net hospitals are 30 percent more likely to have a readmission rates above the national 
average.
216
 However, there are opponents to redefining the HRRP to account for the burden on 
safety net hospitals.
217
 Supporters of the HRRP, as it current stands, argue that allowing a 
patients’ socioeconomic status to be considered would allow hospitals that serve a high 
proportion of vulnerable patients to be held to a lower standard of quality of care.
218
 Ultimately, 
there are two areas of focus on how to redefine the HRRP to prevent unintended consequences. 
The first option is include socioeconomic status, race, ethnicity, community factors, and/or 
English as a primary language when determining a hospitals’ risk adjusted readmission rate. The 
second option is to change the comparison model from a national standard to a peer review 
standard. This note concludes by analyzing both options. 
a. Option One: Redefining the Risk Adjustment  
Is HRRP working to reduce readmissions? Yes. Statistical evidence proves that from 
2007 to 2011 readmission rates remained constant but after the HRRP was implemented rates 
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began to fall.
219
 In fact rates fell from 19 percent to 18.5 percent and eighteen 18 percent in 2012 
and 2013, respectively.
220
 However, even though readmission rates are dropping, this does not 
mean the currently accepted methodology used to calculate the penalty is making the appropriate 
risk adjustments for setting a national readmission benchmark. For this reason, safety net 
hospitals are calling for the risk adjustment to be redefined.
221
 
Many hospitals have been hypercritical of the readmission measures that CMS 
adopted.
222
 One of the biggest critiques is that the current risk adjustment does not take into 
account the socioeconomic status of patients.
223
 Independent research has proven that those with 
lower socioeconomic status lack health care resources, such as a primary care physician, money 
for follow-up care, and a general understanding of their illness.
224
  
The CMS conceded in its FY 2012 IPPS Final Rule that socioeconomic status may need 
to be included as one of the factors in the risk adjustment.
225
 However, CMS ultimately asserts 
that implementing such a policy would allow hospitals to be held to different standards and may 
allow for disparities in care for the disadvantaged.
226
 In Contrast, MedPAC’s June 2013 report 
suggests that CMS take into account the socioeconomic status of hospitals’ patients.227 Further 
studies show that readmission rates are not only correlated to patients’ socioeconomic status but 
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also to race, housing stability, social support, and community resources, and access to timely 
primary care resources.
228
  
While CMS cites to Denver Health as an example of a safety net hospital with a low 
readmission rate it ignores the reality that such a highly integrated system is not easily or cheaply 
implemented.
229
 Further, safety net hospitals are not only hit more frequently, but because a large 
percentage of their revenue often consists of Medicare DRG payments, they are hit with larger 
fines. Further, the concern that taking socioeconomic status into account will mask disparities in 
care for disadvantaged populations is unsupported.  
Redefining the Risk Adjustment Factor to include socioeconomic status could comport 
with the statute as written and would require not action by Congress.
230
 Since the risk adjusted 
readmission ratio must only be endorsed by the NQF CMs could propose, through rule making, 
that the Risk Adjustment Factor be redefined.
231
 CMS should take this step and unburden safety 
net hospitals by altering the Risk Adjustment Factor to include socioeconomic status while 
observing hospital actions to ensure that disparities in care do not arise. 
b. Option Two: Peer-Based Evaluation to Replace National Standard 
Safety net hospitals patients are more vulnerable to readmission because of their higher 
rates of chronic health problems, disability, mental illness, substance abuse and person and social 
problems, such as homelessness, unsafe housing, and unstable employment.
232
 A peer based 
evaluation rather than a national standard would recognize this burden. For this reason, MedPAC 
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suggests that hospitals with high shares of low-income patients be compared to hospitals with a 
similar patient mix for purposes of calculating the penalty assessed against a hospital.
233
  
The risk adjustment would not be altered to include socioeconomic status using this 
methodology.
234
 Under this option, CMS would still report readmission rates without regard for 
income, making disparities in quality of care easily identifiable, while separately assessing a 
financial penalty that took into account the hospitals’ patient mix.235 This would reduce 
disparities in the penalties being assessed at safety net hospitals and non-safety net hospitals.
236
 
Under this methodology, potential disparities would not be masked, which was an issue raised by 
opponents to Option One, discussed supra.
237
 
Through this peer evaluation method, safety net hospitals may face reduced penalties. 
This would allow safety net hospitals to have more resources to address excessive readmission 
rates. A pure economic analysis shows this may create a disincentive to implementing 
readmission reduction processes, i.e. when the cost of implementing process is greater than the 
lowered penalty. However, it is important to remember that many safety net hospitals’ end game 
is not profit maximization but rather the delivery of quality care.
238
 In fact, many hospitals, such 
as Jersey City Medical Center, are trying to reduce readmission for all patients, not just patients 
for which the hospitals faces a penalty because their primary concern is the quality of care its 
patients receive.
239
 MedPAC’s suggested peer evaluation standard could comport with the 
legislation as written, requiring no action from Congress for the same reason Option One is 
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allowable, i.e. the methodology only need to be endorsed by the entity under contract (currently 
the NQF).
240
  
MedPAC’s 2013 Report to Congress simulated computation of readmission penalties 
based on peer evaluation using a hospital’s share of SSI patients to categorize peer groups.241 
MedPAC believe that “using SSI categories to compute penalties eliminates most of the” 
disparities that exist in penalties assessed to safety net versus non-safety net hospitals.
242
 
MedPAC admits then even under an SSI categorization methodology that hospitals with the 
highest share of poor patient still have higher average penalties.
243
 However, under the proposed 
peer evaluation methodology the disparity between safety net hospitals and non-safety net 
hospitals is greatly reduced.
244
 So, while a peer evaluation system is not perfect it may be a move 
in the correct direction. 
Conclusion 
A general observation shows that many hospitals are reacting to the Hospital 
Readmissions Reduction Program. Further analysis shows that the Hospitals Readmissions 
Reduction Program is in fact reducing readmissions, as rates have fallen slightly over the last two 
years. However, this does not necessarily mean that the Hospital Readmissions Reduction 
Program as it stands is a total success. Many providers continue to criticize the HRRP for the 
unfair burden it places on safety net hospitals. MedPAC and hospitals are calling for policy 
decisions to be altered to reduce this burden. As the HRRP moves forward and continues to 
expand the penalty percentage as well as applicable conditions, CMS must continue to monitor 
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the measures and seriously consider altering the Risk Adjustment Factor to include 
socioeconomic status and/or move away from a national standard to a peer evaluation standard. 
